Socrates, the founder of the inductive method (Watson, 1978), was a master at analytical reasoning. Plato, his student, believed in the reality of abstract Forms perceivable only through "the mind's eye," and imperfectly represented in everyday life (Plato's Republic, Jowett trans., 1871/1944, p. 258). Aristotle, Plato's student, denied the Platonic Forms, and turned to biological classification in his search for truth. Like Plato, Aristotle believed that imagery was important, but he added the element of sequentiality: "we recall these images by ordering them in sequence, associating them with one another according to the principles of similarity, contrast, and contiguity" (cited in Wittrock, 1978, p. 61). The threads of analytical, sequential reasoning versus nonsequential, geometric visions of reality create a fascinating dialectic of differing world views throughout the history of psychology. Consider Locke's associationism, Pavlov's classical conditioning, Watson's behaviorism, Skinner's operant conditioning, and Bloom's taxonomy compared with Kant's a priori Anschauungen—“the spatial arrangement of objects given in perception" (Boring, 1950, p. 248); the gestalt psychologists—Wertheimer, Kohler, Koffka; Piaget's assessment of formal operational thought; and Guilford's structure-of-intellect model. Some of the greatest minds in psychology conveyed their ideas in analytical sequences of ideas, while others tried to communicate images and geometrical relationships. Is it possible that the clashes in conceptualization can be traced to differences in cerebral processing modes of the theorists?